“However, Manent notes this ‘ancient’ or classical natural law has been replaced by an indeterminate regime of ‘human rights’; while we democratic moderns no longer agree that man, by nature, is oriented towards certain ends or purposes, or, for example, that sexual differences are a part of man’s nature, we appeal with religious zeal to an objective, all-encompassing standard of human rights.”
Pierre Manent, the French political philosopher, brilliantly elucidates the ills and turmoil of the modern “hypertrophy of theory” in his book Natural Law and Human Rights. Recognizing theoretical liberalism’s tendency to atomize the moral agent into a boundless, wandering “individual-conatus” unguided and uninformed by Law, Manent proposes a practical natural law, a law not composed of abstract axioms, but a law informed by the “three great human motives.” The “pleasant,” “useful,” and “noble” constitute such motives, and by balancing the three, the agent can produce meaningful action.
Manent begins Natural Law and Human Rights by observing the modern eschewal of the classical natural law tradition; any objective order or hierarchy of motives or “universal criterion” is leveled by liberalism’s theoretical force. However, Manent notes this “ancient” or classical natural law has been replaced by an indeterminate regime of “human rights”; while we democratic moderns no longer agree that man is oriented towards certain ends or purposes, or, for example, that sexual differences are a part of man’s nature, we appeal with religious zeal to an objective, all-encompassing standard of human rights. These rights, the modern argues, are to liberate the individual from prejudicial or ancient traditions or standards that withhold freedom; they are to unshackle man from any notion of law, human, natural, or divine.
The trajectory of human rights, or the “natural law” of the modern age, is to restore man to how he was, or as Rousseau argued, to be “just as free as before.” Indeed, liberalism’s very foundation is a “state of nature” composed of free, lawless individuals. While this state of nature has no actual, practical bearing in the natural world, the project of human rights seeks to return man to this theoretical foundation. This state of nature-ism, Manent explains, rips man from his station as a moral agent who thinks, reasons, and acts, and posits him as a mere individual who “produces effects that resemble actions.” Rather than looking at humans “as they are,” or, in other words, as they act, theoretical liberalism removes itself from the realm of practice and observes man from the lofty station of mere theory.
“Under the old regime of natural law,” Manent argues, “homosexuality was considered a ‘disorder’ or a ‘deviation.’” Now, “we demand that this behavior or disposition be regarded as just as ‘natural’ as the heterosexual orientation.” Manent warns, and surely the Latter-day Saint reader can agree, that “the spiritual stakes of this question are of the greatest importance for all of us.”
Manent boldly asserts that the legal enshrinement of same-sex “marriage” was an outright denial of the existence of a natural law, a “positive law whose intention targets the very meaning of the human order.” This metaphysical move, Manent argues, requires man to “recognize by word and deed that there is no natural law, or that the world can and must be organized without reference to a natural law.” This legalization is both a surprise and an expectation; as theoretical liberalism’s foundation is detached from nature, the liberal project would logically run all the way up to sexual differences; however, it was quite unthinkable to deny the obvious natural differences of men and women whose coupling, after all, is the manner by which our very modern, liberal society must continue. “Under the old regime of natural law,” Manent argues, “homosexuality was considered a ‘disorder’ or a ‘deviation.’” Now, “we demand that this behavior or disposition be regarded as just as ‘natural’ as the heterosexual orientation.” Manent warns, and surely the Latter-day Saint reader can agree, that “the spiritual stakes of this question are of the greatest importance for all of us.”
While Manent provides a useful outline of the “hypertrophy of theory,” covering important figures such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Luther, he also assists the reader in recovering a practical, grounded understanding of action and Law. Manent’s three human motives, the useful, pleasant, and noble, are offered as the “foundation for rules of justice that are comprehensible and accessible to all.” Following Aristotle, Manent argues that human action is motivated and guided by ends and purposes. Manent’s practical natural law does not predetermine action or prescribe a specific “exhaustive” list of dos and don’ts but instead guides the agent, leaving the “play proper to practical life”; Manent’s three motives “leave room” for the agent to “deliberate and then to choose,” avoiding the prescriptive tendency of human rights. Manent’s almost hyper-focus on the goodness and beauty of action reminds the reader that he is, after all, an acting agent and, perhaps, his action is constitutive of an eternal God’s plan.
Indeed, there is much to add to this review, and Manent, in the latter portion of his book, states his proposition “leaves much to be desired,” but surely, there is much to learn in Natural Law and Human Rights. Manent encourages the reader to seek the wisdom of Thomas Aquinas as “the author who can best help us” as Christians to confront “the loss of law’s meaning.” Then, we may slowly regain our footing in our practical world. This journey, Manent concludes, “[depends] equally on our wisdom and on our prayers.”
Written by: Jacob Christensen
Editor-In-Chief at the Cougar Chronicle
The opinions in this article are those of the author.
The Cougar Chronicle is an independent student-run newspaper and is not affiliated with Brigham Young University or The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
